383220 — F&F Co., Ltd.

F&F Co., Ltd. (KOSPI: 383220) — deep-value analysis

2026-08-24 · price … · market cap … · 37,481,574 shares outstanding (38,307,075 issued − 825,501 treasury)

Primary sources: DART semi-annual report rcpNo 20260814004123 (H1 2026, auditor-reviewed) and DART annual report rcpNo 20260318001512 (FY2025/2024/2023, audited), downloaded to the local filing archive. The company is NOT registered with the SEC — no CIK, no EDGAR; the primary filings are at DART (dart.fss.or.kr), in Korean, K-IFRS, currency KRW. Price, market cap and quarterly series: yfinance 383220.KS. Consensus and market context: the research brief from 08/24/2026 plus the Eugene Investment report from 06/05/2026 (analyst 이해니).

Symbol resolution note. The ticker “383220” doesn’t resolve bare on Yahoo, and this morning’s run produced a completely empty data pack. The correct symbol is 383220.KS (KOSPI). I did not run EDGAR — it would have returned either nothing or a foreign company.

Executive summary

F&F is the Korean fashion-brand house that holds the MLB license for Korea, China and Hong Kong, plus MLB KIDS, Discovery Expedition, Duvetica, Supra and Sergio Tacchini. In FY2025 it made … revenue and … operating profit (margin 24.2%), and in H1 2026 960.5 bn revenue (… y/y) and 240.0 bn operating profit (…), with margin climbing from 23.5% to 25.0%. At … the stock trades at 1.16× book value and at 5.98× the reported 2025 EPS.

The thesis isn’t “cheap fashion stock” — it’s a sum of parts hidden by a balance sheet. Three assets sit side by side in the same company and the market prices them as if they were one:

1. The operating business. TTM revenue 2,010.0 bn, TTM operating profit 500.9 bn, after-tax operating profit (cleaned of the non-operating contribution) ~….
2. Net financial cash of … at 06/30/2026 (cash 470.7 bn minus borrowings 31.8 bn — all short-term, long-term borrowing ZERO). That’s … per share, 18.4% of the price.
3. Equity-method investments, book value …, of which … is the TaylorMade exposure — F&F put … in 2021 into two Centroid funds (57.8% in No. 7, 41.5% in No. 7-1) that bought the global golf brand at an enterprise value of …. That’s … per share at book value, 33.5% of market cap.

Subtract net cash and the associates from market cap and the operating business is valued at … — that is, 2.95× after-tax operating profit and 2.28× EBIT. For a business with a 24… operating margin, 23.2% ROE and no debt, that’s a dislocation, not a valuation.

What exactly keeps the price down, and why it’s legitimate. Three things, all real: (a) MLB, which brings 75.7% of revenue, is a LICENSED brand, and the contract term and royalty rate are explicitly stated as confidential in the DART filing — the investor can’t see the contract three-quarters of the business depends on; (b) China makes 49.7% of revenue with a flat store footprint (1,055 units), so growth comes from same-store sales, not expansion; (c) the TaylorMade stake is an illiquid limited-partner position in a private equity fund, with a sale that has failed twice (Old Tom Capital named preferred bidder in January 2026, losing that status in April 2026 over financing) and a latent dispute with the fund’s manager over F&F’s pre-approval rights.

Estimated value. Five triangulated models give a range from … (stress scenario: MLB license under pressure, associates at 50% of cost) to … (Monte Carlo median across 20,000 scenarios), with the five models’ median at …. Broker consensus sits at 93,900-…, i.e. the lower part of my range, which is reassuring: I’m not building a case the sell-side market doesn’t see at all.

Verdict: BUY, with moderate position sizing. The margin of safety is wide and supported by observable assets, not projections. But concentration on a single non-transparent license and a single country is real, and the main catalyst (monetizing TaylorMade) has already missed twice. This is a 2… of portfolio position, not a maximum-conviction one — not because the valuation is weak, but because the contract risk is binary and can’t be diligenced from outside.